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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE PUSHBACK FROM THE LEFT

JERRY KANG*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, the mind sciences have provided remarkable
insights about how our brains process social categories. For example,
scientists have discovered that implicit biases—in the form of stereotypes and
attitudes that we are unaware of, do not consciously intend, and might reject
upon conscious self-reflection—exist and have wide-ranging behavioral
consequences.1 Such findings destabilize our self-serving self-conceptions as
bias-free. Not surprisingly, there has been backlash from the political Right.
This Article examines some aspects of the more surprising pushback from the
Left.
Part I briefly explains how new findings in the mind sciences, especially
Implicit Social Cognition, are incorporated into the law, legal scholarship, and
legal institutions, under the banner of “behavioral realism.” Part II describes
the pushback from the Left. Part III responds by suggesting that our deepest
understanding of social hierarchy and discrimination requires analysis at
multiple layers of knowledge. Instead of trading off knowledge, for example,
at the cognitive layer for the sociological layer (or vice versa), we should seek
understanding at each layer, and then interpenetrate the entire stack.2
I. BEHAVIORAL REALISM ABOUT THE MIND SCIENCES
“Behavioral realism” is a nascent school of legal thought advanced by
legal scholars and psychologists. Broadly speaking, it seeks to naturalize the
law by making the law more continuous with modern understandings of human

* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. <kang@law.ucla.edu> <http://jerrykang.net>.
1. A substantial body of scientific literature documents implicit bias. For a review, see
Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 433–35 (2007).
2. This approach is consistent with the one recommended by Steven Pinker. See STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 70 (2002) (calling for a
“hierarchical reductionism” which is not about replacing one field of knowledge but about
connecting and unifying different levels of analysis).
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decision-making and behavior.3 More specifically, behavioral realism is
driven by new findings in the mind sciences. When some new scientific
consensus emerges, behavioral realists compare that new understanding to the
folk psychology embedded in the law.4 When the gap between the two is
sufficiently large, behavioral realists ask the law to take account, by either
changing or providing some transparent explanation why it cannot.5
To take a concrete example, consider what Professor john powell identified
in this year’s Childress Lecture as the modern rewriting of more classical
assumptions about discrimination. In what he calls the Enlightenment
understanding, individuals were presumed to be fully transparent to
themselves.6 Given this view, any behavior (e.g., “I’m passing over this
resumé”) that turned on some individual’s social category (“The name on this
resumé is Lakisha, not Emily, so I infer that the applicant is Black”) would be
known to the individual as such.
But the modern evidence of implicit social cognitions undermines these
classical assumptions. We may, in fact, be passing on that resumé because of
race but without explicit knowledge or purpose.7 Deciding precisely what to
do about such discoveries in the form of preventative policy, doctrinal
interpretation, or statutory reform is, of course, bedeviling. But for a
behavioral realist, sticking our heads in the sand about the new science is not
an option.
II. BACKLASH
A.

Backlash from the Right

Recent scientific discoveries have deeply upset the Right.8 Here’s why:
the Right’s Fundamental Belief is that we already live and compete in a
meritocratic, color-blind, gender-blind, social category-blind, market-based
tournament. In this tournament, there will always be winners and losers—

3. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1000–01
(2006).
4. See Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 1, at 440.
5. See id.
6. john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond an
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1039–46 (2010).
7. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 991, 1006 (2004); Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World
Evidence, 2007 INST. FOR STUDY LAB. 1, 1 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2006); Amy Wax & Philip E. Tetlock, We Are All
Racists at Heart, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A16.
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that’s precisely the point of the competition. Losers will cry foul, but they are
viewed as simply whining about the bad results of a fair game. Under the
Right’s Fundamental Belief, everyone already enjoys equality of opportunity,
and the losers are only complaining about losing.9
Two lines of research have been gnawing away at the Fundamental Belief.
Auditing studies performed by behavioral economists have demonstrated that
identical candidates receive disparate treatment as a function of meritirrelevant social categories. These findings have been made in various
domains, such as call-back interviews,10 apartment rentals,11 and even writing
submissions.12 The second line of research comes from Implicit Social
Cognition, described above,13 which provides causal cognitive mechanisms for
such disparate treatment. Through hundreds of experiments in laboratories,
scientists have measured something called implicit bias and demonstrated that
it predicts behavior, at least on the margins.14 Coupled together, the audit
studies and Implicit Social Cognition findings threaten the Right’s
Fundamental Belief. Worse, they do so using precisely those rigorous and
quantitative techniques that the Right demanded when dismissing victim
accounts about discrimination as mere anecdote.
B.

Pushback from the Left

The backlash from the Right is predictable because the science provides
greater evidence that we live in an unjust world, in greater need of reform.15

9. Of course, this is meant to be a stylized exposition of the Fundamental Belief. I take it
that almost no one believes this absolutely and would qualify the tenet at least partially.
10. See Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Discrimination in the American Workplace:
Findings and Research Opportunities Using Paired-Comparison Testing, ___ J. SOC. ISSUES
(forthcoming 2010) (observing that employment auditing studies have revealed discriminatory
behavior by “20% to 40% of employers”).
11. See, e.g., Stephen L. Ross & Margery A. Turner, Housing Discrimination in
Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes Between 1989 and 2000, 52 SOC. PROBS. 152, 165–
69 (2005) (reporting audit results that showed net discrimination against African Americans and
Hispanics in the rental markets).
12. Emily G. Sands, Opening the Curtain on Playwright Gender: An Integrated Economic
Analysis of Discrimination in American Theater 1 (Apr. 15, 2009) (unpublished undergraduate
thesis, Princeton University) (on file with Department of Economics, Princeton University).
13. See Lane, Kang & Banaji, supra note 1, at 429.
14. For a readable summary of the research demonstrating predictive validity, see Jost et al.,
The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should
Ignore, 29 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 39 (2009). For a meta-analysis of 122 research
reports, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009).
15. For further discussion of the Right’s reaction, and its invocation of a “junk science”
rhetoric, see Jerry Kang & Kristin A. Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
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But there has also been pushback from the Left. It would be an exaggeration
to call it “backlash” because the scientific findings generally support a
progressive agenda.16 But deep concerns lurk about deploying science and
committing to behavioral realism. The anxiety is connected to the distrust of
what john powell calls the Enlightenment model. The pushback comprises two
key elements: a rejection of scientific exceptionalism, and an accusation of
reductionism.
Rejection of Scientific Exceptionalism. Behavioral realism obviously
banks a great deal on the special role of science. It supposes that “the causal
processes of the real world exist and operate independent of what we know or
think about them, and that the scientific method provides one of the best ways
of understanding those causal processes.”17 Some on the Left, including
philosophers of science, sociologists of scientific knowledge production, and
cultural studies commentators might question this reliance on science as naive
or unsophisticated. Indeed, they may be suspicious about the call for
“evidence” and “data” and quantitative techniques, which they view as
objective-sounding covers for ideology or politics.
Accusation of Reductionism. Even if a critic accepts the value of science
(either for its empirical success or ability to discover reality), she might still be
uncomfortable with bodies of science that situate “racism” and “sexism” and
other –isms inside individual brains. Picking this unit of analysis is seen as
reductionist because it fails to capture the bigger picture, in the forms of
“institutional,” “structural,” or “societal” racism.
By contrast, other
methodological approaches with a larger unit of analysis such as the “group”
or “culture,” are touted as better-suited to illuminate the problems of social
justice, with attention to history and power.
These critiques sounding in scientific exceptionalism and reductionism are
sincere and important but mostly miss the mark. To explore how and why, I
start with a concrete example.

Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1633071.
16. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1117 (2006) (“Unwarranted discrimination exists
here and now: it can be documented through scientific methods . . . .”).
17. See id. at 1065.
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III. TOWARDS INTERPENETRATING INSIGHTS
A.

Racial Mechanics Model: An Example

It is a staple of Critical Race Theory to say that “race is a social
construction.”18 In other words, race is not self-evident biology or taxonomy.
But this important general insight is somewhat vague in the particulars and
invites conflicting interpretations and applications. For instance, what is not a
social construction?19 Even a hammer is produced by society, through
technology and market mechanisms that can be analytically unpacked and
unmasked. Also, is there nothing “biological” about race? After all, isn’t a
person’s racial category inherited from her parents?
To help grapple with such complexities, I have proposed a model of “racial
mechanics” that provides a simple, social cognitive articulation to the mantra
that “race is a social construction.”20 That simple model focuses on a bilateral
interaction between a “perceiver” and “target.”21 Upon encountering a target
individual, the perceiver classifies that individual into a (1) racial category
according to relevant (2) mapping rules provided to us by culture and any
specific rules relevant to the context.22 Once that mapping is performed—
typically instantaneously—a set of (3) racial meanings is activated that alters
the way that the perceiver interacts with the target.23 Here is the diagram:24

18. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of Inequality, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1762–63 (2001); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:
Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27
(1994). Much of this draws from the sociological work of Michael Omi & Howard Winant. See
generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994).
19. For a relevant description of such social constructions, see generally IAN HACKING, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999).
20. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497–1502 (2005).
21. Id. at 1499.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1500.
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To say that race is a social construction is to say that all three core
elements: the racial categories, the racial mapping rules, and the racial
meanings are all constructed by social and historical practices, and not
predetermined by some deity or genetics. First, the racial categories change
over time and as a function of politics—just consider how the Census has
counted “race” differently over the centuries.25 Second, the mapping rules are
also dynamic—consider how and why, in 1854, the California Supreme Court
classified the Chinese as racially Indian or Black in order to prevent them from
testifying in court.26 Third, consider how the racial meanings associated with a
particular category can rapidly change—e.g., for Asian Americans, debased
laborers working on the railroads (mid 1800s) to yellow peril (1940s) to model
minority (late 1960s).27
My model is social cognitive in that it emphasizes the basic and
fundamental cognitive act of categorization of human beings into social
groups. It is an implicit social cognitive model because it emphasizes the
automaticity, lack of self-awareness, and situated nature of the racial
mechanics. Finally, it is proffered as a useful articulation of the axiom that
“race is a social construction” because it isolates three distinct ways in which
we might mean the point: that the categories themselves are constructed; that
we map individuals and entire groups of people into the categories that we
have constructed; and that we attach certain meanings (stereotypes and
attitudes) to the categories that we have constructed.
B.

Comfort on Scientific Exceptionalism

The basic idea that our brains function by classifying objects into
categories is not very controversial, neither to the Right nor the Left. What is
more controversial is that we might do the same to human beings (not just
objects), by grouping them into social categories. Still more controversial is
that this categorization might function automatically and implicitly to influence
our behavior.28

25. For example, in 1977, the federal government shifted from four major racial categories
(American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black; and White) to five
(American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander; and White). See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in
Census 2000 and Beyond, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefact
cb.html. Notice that Pacific Islanders were split out of the Asian or Pacific Islander into its own
separate category with Native Hawaiians.
26. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399 (1854).
27. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, “Foreign-Ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World
War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 18–44 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlcok, supra note 8, at 1107–15.
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It is this last, most controversial point that is being “proved up” by the
science, to the consternation of those who believe that colorblindness already
reigns. When someone suggests casually, without scientific evidence, that
unconscious racism infects everything that we do, many people’s reactions are
deeply skeptical. They retort, “What do you mean by ‘racism’? What does it
mean to ‘infect’? How much, and under what circumstances? Why is it that I
can’t observe it in myself, even though I can observe other aspects of my mind
and body? Aren’t you just complaining because you lack merit?”
In response, one could use language and arguments derived from
nonscientific domains, such as literature, Freudian psychoanalysis, or religious
faith. But as a descriptive matter, such arguments will not be very persuasive
to the skeptic in modern America. By contrast, language and arguments based
on “science,” as regularly practiced by 21st century scientists tenured at
research universities, pack a more persuasive punch.29 Again, I am merely
describing the brute fact that scientific evidence culled through standard
hypothesis-testing procedures deploying modern statistics and published in
peer-reviewed journals is considered to be the “gold” standard for
policymaking, including legal reform. Accordingly, if the Left wants to be
pragmatic about its agenda, it seems sensible to pay attention to what science
says. This is not to recommend putting all eggs in the scientific basket, but it
is an argument not to abandon it altogether.
In emphasizing pragmatics, I am not staking out a purely instrumentalist
position that would, for instance, forsake science the moment it became
politically convenient to do so. Instead, to repeat, behavioral realism relies on
the notion that “the causal processes of the real world exist and operate
independent of what we know or think about them.”30 This notion underscores
a sort of metaphysical modesty that recognizes that when the tree falls in the
forest, it makes sound even if there are no human beings around to hear it. In
other words, there is a reality “out there” regardless of whether sentient beings
are around to perceive it. Those who reject this position will obviously be irate
at any form of scientific exceptionalism, however mild.
But this metaphysical modesty may mask an epistemic
presumptuousness,31 about science somehow being able to discover “reality”
or “truth.” After all, what does it mean to claim “that the scientific method
provides one of the best ways of understanding those causal processes”?32

29. See Kang, supra note 20, at 1496–97.
30. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 16, at 1065.
31. I borrow the “metaphysical modesty” and “epistemic presumptuousness” turns-of-phrase
from the very accessible lectures by Professor Jeffrey L. Kasser. See Jeffrey L. Kasser, Popper
and the Problem of Demarcation, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 2006, at 6, 6 (The Teaching
Company Course No. 4100, 2006).
32. See id. (emphasis added).
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This question raises the difficult realism versus antirealism debate within the
philosophy of science literature, upon which I remain largely agnostic. I am
most interested in science’s ability to achieve what Miriam Solomon calls
“empirical success.”33 In other words, behavioral realists believe that science
is “one of the best ways of understanding [causal] processes” in the sense that
it increases the likelihood of empirical success, in terms of prediction,
explanation, technological manipulation, and prevention. Whether such
empirical success is caused by some correspondence to “reality” or “truth” is
hard to prove (and one that practicing scientists rarely consider). Some such
correspondence is my intuition; however, I am happy to concede it as a hunch.
Perhaps this agnostic stance on the realism versus anti-realism debate will
decrease anxiety, at least for some, about scientific exceptionalism.
Finally, although it goes without saying, I should underscore that
behavioral realism rejects the naturalistic fallacy. That which “is” says very
little about that which “ought” to be. For example, the fact that stereotyping is
easy and natural says nothing about its normative attractiveness in various
domains of social life and law.
To summarize, behavioral realists are scientists, lawyers, and legal
scholars asking the law to account for new discoveries about how human
beings think and behave. Their stance towards science reflects metaphysical
modesty and pragmatism: because science has produced substantial empirical
success, it has been granted greater deference than other forms of knowledge in
policymaking contexts, and reformists should recognize this fact. Finally, in
the context of discrimination, evidence-based accounts of disparate treatment
are compelling even to those who are skeptical about first-hand narrative
accounts of victimization, which tend to be dismissed as subjective and selfserving.34
C. Comfort on Reductionism
The other foundation of Left pushback is reductionism.35 The complaint is
that any cognitive approach locates “racism” in the heads of specific
perpetrators. This perpetrator model, it is said, analyzes racism as the
misfiring of neurons in a few pathological individuals, which badly
33. See, e.g., MIRIAM SOLOMON, SOCIAL EMPIRICISM 16–17, 27–29 (2001).
34. Again, I do not want to seem too naïve. Even findings supported by a substantial body
of experimental science can still be dismissed as “junk science” that is ideologically motivated.
See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1067–72.
35. See generally Ingo Brigandt & Alan Love, Reductionism in Biology, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 27, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reductionbiology/ (“The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, concepts, explanations, or
methods from one scientific domain (typically at higher levels of organization) can be deduced
from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from another domain of
science (typically one about lower levels of organization).”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE PUSHBACK FROM THE LEFT

1147

mischaracterizes what is really going on. Instead, if we picked a larger unit of
analysis, we would be better able to see things like institutional, structural, and
societal racism—and not be constrained to individual pathologies.36
I am sympathetic to this criticism, and some of the earliest seminal writing
in Critical Race Theory emphasized the deep limitations of a “perpetrator
perspective” model of discrimination.37 Yet, this complaint commits an
either/or fallacy. The deepest understanding of any process such as
racialization comes from multiple levels of analysis that can and should be
integrated together. Consider the various units of analysis one could use to
explain something like “racism”: the neuron, brain, person, family, group,
firm, institution, system, structure, culture, society, or history.38 When terms
such as institutional, structural, or societal bias are well-defined and
operationalized, there is no reason why they cannot be integrated with Implicit
Social Cognition into the fullest understanding of how multiple causes, at
multiple levels, contribute to social inequalities. The fact that implicit biases
may influence interpretation of ambiguous behavior, for instance, conflicts in
no way with various economic and sociological models of inequality inertia.39
To the contrary, they add an additional explanatory layer to the deepest
understanding of persistent inequalities among social groups.
As a concrete demonstration, consider again my simple model of racial
mechanics. In that social cognitive model, I pointed out that the racial
categories, the racial mapping rules, and racial meanings are all socially
constructed. Although the science of Implicit Social Cognition is extremely

36. See, e.g., David Wellman, Unconscious Racism, Social Cognition Theory and the Legal
Intent Doctrine: The Neuron Fires Next Time, in HANDBOOK OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
RELATIONS (Hernán Vera & Joe R. Feagin, eds.) (“[S]ociological understanding of unconscious
racism avoids . . . conceptual pitfalls” and can “provide a far more potent critique of the intent
doctrine than social cognition neuroscience.”).
37. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1052–57 (1978).
38. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human
Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?, 74 J. PERSONALITY
1557, 1571 (2006) (explaining that everything can be described from the “molecular to molar”).
According to Ryan and Deci, the goal is to pick the best level of analysis, which “captures the
variables most relevant to what is to be explained and that is most relevant for effective
interventions.” Id. at 1572.
39. See, e.g., GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 23–30 (2002)
(discussing self-reinforcing stereotypes); Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive
Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117–22 (2002) (applying lock-in theory
to explain the inequalities between Blacks and Whites in education, housing, and employment);
Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV.
727, 742–49 (2000) (providing overview of lock-in theory, drawing on antitrust law and
concepts).
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useful in providing compelling evidence that racial mechanics take place
automatically, typically without self-awareness, that body of science tells us
little about how and why the Census pulled out Pacific Islanders from the
racial category of Asians.40 Social cognition tells us little about the political
economy that drove adoption of the rule of hypodescent (one drop Black
blood),41 a racial mapping rule that maximized “property” in the form of
human slaves. Social cognition tells us little about how the Federal
Communications Commission came to define “public interest” for broadcasters
in a way that had the unintended consequence of increasing negative racial
attitudes.42 This is not to say that the social cognitive model explains nothing.
It explains a great deal, and most importantly, provides the most potent
response to the presumption that we are all already colorblind. But this level
of analysis cannot function alone, and it needs supporting analysis from above
and even below. What we need is interpenetration, across all the layers of
knowledge.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I remind the Left (including myself) to avoid disciplinary
parochialism, especially when it betrays a poor understanding of another
discipline.43 Of course, there may be opportunity costs. For example,
behavioral realists might be distracting attention and resources from other
methodologies, such as literature, cultural studies, sociology, history, and
psychoanalysis.44 Whether there is a net benefit in insight can only be

40. Terrance Reeves & Claudette Bennett, U.S. Census Bureau, THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC
ISLANDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-540.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 23–27 (1991) (discussing rules of hypodescent).
42. See Kang, supra note 20, at 1545–53.
43. The sharpest disagreement I have with Wellman’s sociological analysis is his claim that
“biases are fixed.” See supra note 36. To the contrary, implicit biases are quite malleable. I also
disagree with Wellman’s claim that a scientific model of bias destroys agency and thus moral or
legal accountability. It could, but it doesn’t have to.
44. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1120–21 (2009)
(making this criticism). Banks and Ford’s critique may actually not come from the Left. On the
one hand, it seems to be from the Left because it suggests that nearly all of the implicit bias
findings should be seen really as evidence of explicit or conscious biases that are simply
concealed successfully. See id. at 1065–68. Indeed, talk of merely “implicit” biases is criticized
as a sugar-coated palliative. See id. at 1103–10. On the other hand, their critique could be from
the Right since it adopts the same “junk science” rhetoric, see id. at 1110–13, with the attendant
list of politically correct “thought control” bogeymen, see id. at 1118 (fearing pharmacological
cures that treat bigotry with a “rainbow-colored capsule available by prescription”); id. at 1119
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answered after the fact. One way to gauge the worth of the investment is to see
how much more the science (as compared to other forms of progressive
discourse) upsets the Right.
This symposium is dedicated to the remarkable life work of john powell.
Part of the specialness of his mind and work comes from a willingness to
interpenetrate the layers of knowledge, across methodologies and levels of
abstraction. He is best known for his work on institutions and structures, but
he is no foe to the recent findings in implicit bias. Instead, he vigorously seeks
synthesis, synergy, and full understanding, which is always helpful in doing
the right thing.

(comparing implicit bias approach to re-education camps and “polic[ing of] thoughts”). Maybe
they’re so Left that they came out on the Right.
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